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DISAGREEMENT,  RELATIVISM  AND  DOXASTIC  REVISION  
  
J.  Adam  Carter  
  
ABSTRACT:  I   investigate  the  implication  of  the  truth-­‐‑relativist’s  alleged  ‘faultless  disagreements1’  
for   issues   in   the   epistemology   of   disagreement.   A   conclusion   I   draw   is   that   the   type   of  
disagreement   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   claims   (as  a  key  advantage  over   the  contextualist)   to  preserve  
fails  in  principle  to  be  epistemically  significant  in  the  way  we  should  expect  disagreements  to  be  
in  social-­‐‑epistemic  practice.  In  particular,  the  fact  of  faultless  disagreement  fails  to  ever  play  the  
epistemically  significant  role  of  making  doxastic  revision  (at  least  sometimes)  rationally  required  
for   either   party   in   a   (faultless)   disagreement.   That   the   truth-­‐‑relativists’   disagreements   over  
centred   content   fail   to   play   this   epistemically   significant   role   that   disagreements  
characteristically  play  in  social  epistemology  should  leave  us  sceptical  that  disagreement  is  what  
the  truth-­‐‑relativist  has  actually  preserved.  
  
1.  Introduction:  Two  Debates  About  Disagreement  
Disagreement  plays  important  philosophical  roles  in  current  debates  in  social  epistemology  
and  in  the  philosophy  of   language,   though  for  very  different  reasons.  In  the  philosophy  of  
language,  arguments  from  faultless  disagreement  are  used  to  motivate  truth-­‐‑relativism  over  
contextualism   in   certain   areas   of   discourse.   In   social   epistemology,   disagreement   is   at   the  
centre  of  debates  between  conformists  and  non-­‐‑conformists  about  doxastic   revision   (in   the  
face  of  disagreement  with  a  recognised  epistemic  peer).  What  can  these  debates  learn  from  
each  other?  This  is  a  largely  unexplored  question.  
My  aim  here   is   to  develop  a  particular  strand  of  connection  between  these  debates;  
specifically,   I   explore   the   implications   for   the   debate   between   conformism   and   non-­‐‑
conformism   in   social   epistemology   if   the   truth-­‐‑relativist’s  picture  of  disagreement   is   right.  
As   we’ll   see,   the   implications   are   more   substantial   than   one   might   originally   suspect.  
Toward  the  end  of  exploring  these   implications,   I  want   to   first   (in  §2)  give  a  clear,  general  
picture  of  the  role  disagreement  plays  in  arguments  for  truth  relativism,  and  in  §3  I’ll  outline  
and  discuss  just  how  disagreement  over  centred  content  is  supposed  to  work,  both  in  theory  
in   practice.   In   §4,   I’ll   explain   briefly   what   is   at   stake   between   conformists   and   non-­‐‑
conformists   in   the   epistemology   of   disagreement,   focusing   on   the   role   recognized   peer  
                                                                                                              
1  Faultless  disagreement-­‐‑style  arguments  are  typically  used  motivate  truth-­‐‑relativism  in  various  
domains  of  discourse.  For  canonical  presentations  of  faultless  disagreement  arguments  for  truth-­‐‑
relativism,  see  Kolbel  (2003)  and  MacFarlane  (2007).  See  also  M.  Kolbel  and  M.  Garca-­‐‑Carpintero  
(Eds.),  Relative  Truth,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  for  a  collection  of  recent  papers  defending  and  
opposing  arguments  from  faultless  disagreement.  Cf.  Cappelen  &  Hawthorne  (2010)  for  a  recent  
challenge  to  these  arguments,  and  to  truth-­‐‑relativism  more  generally.  
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disagreement   is   supposed   to   play   in   doxastic   revision.   In   §5,   I’ll   explore   the   question   of  
whether   centred-­‐‑content   disagreements   appealed   to   by   truth-­‐‑relativists   can   play   the   same  
epistemically   significant   role  with   respect   to   questions   about  whether   doxastic   revision   is  
rationally  required  in  the  face  of  such  recognized  disagreements  with  epistemic  peers.  
  
2.  Truth-­‐‑relativism,  contextualism  and  disagreement  
Considerations  to  do  with  disagreement  bolster  an  argument  characteristic  of  a  recent  wave  
of  what  I’ll  call  “New  Relativism2”  in  the  philosophy  of  language.  New  Relativists  endorse  
truth-­‐‑relativism   in   certain  areas  of  discourse  where   the   truth  of   claims  seems   to  depend,  as  
MacFarlane  puts  it,  ‘not  only  on  how  things  are  with  the  objects  they  explicitly  concern,  but  
on  how   things  are  with   some  subject  not   explicitly  mentioned.’  Examples  of   such  areas  of  
discourse  that  have  been  fertile  ground  for  New  Relativists  are:  predicates  of  personal  taste3,  
epistemic   modals4,   knowledge   attributions5,   future   contingents6,   gradable   adjectives7  and  
indicative   conditionals8.   The   most   fertile   ground   for   New   Relativism   has   been   discourse  
involving   predicates   of   personal   taste,   and   for   ease   of   exposition,   I’ll   articulate   the   truth-­‐‑
relativist’s  position  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  this  particular  area  of  discourse.  
Let  P  represent  the  area  of  discourse  that  is  predicates  of  personal  taste  (such  as  tasty,  
fun).  Truth-­‐‑relativism  with  respect  to  P-­‐‑utterances  claims  that  (roughly):  the  truth  of  one’s  P-­‐‑
utterance  depends  in  part  on  a  context  of  assessment—the  context  in  which  the  proposition  is  
being  evaluated  as  true  or  false.  Accordingly,  “Miniature  golf  is  fun,”  does  not  get  a  truth-­‐‑
value   simpliciter;   it   gets   a   truth   value   only   once,   as   Lasersohn   (2005)   puts   it,   a   judge   or  
standards  parameter  (in  the  context  of  evaluation)  is  specified.  And  the  relevant  standard  at  
play   in   the   context   of   assessment   is   not   uniquely   determined   by   the   context   of   use.   As  
Crispin  Wright  (2007)  has  put  it:  vary  [the  context  of  assessment]  and  the  truth  value  of  the  
utterance   can   vary,   even   though   the   context   of   its  making   and   the   associated   state   of   the  
world  remain  fixed.  This  is  a  somewhat  simplistic  view  of  the  truth-­‐‑relativist  position,  but  it  
will  do  for  now.  
Even   the   briefest   reflection   on   the   implications   of   truth-­‐‑relativism   reveals   the  
position  to  constitute  a  radical  departure  from  orthodoxy.  Why  exactly  would  one  endorse  
truth-­‐‑relativism   in   any   domain   of   discourse?   After   all,   as   Cappelen   &   Hawthorne   (2010)  
                                                                                                              
2  I’m  following  here  Maria  Baghramian’s  (forthcoming)  terminology;  Cappelen  &  Hawthorne  (2010)  
refer  to  this  recent  movement  in  analytic  philosophy  of  language  “analytic  relativism”  while  Wright  
(2007)  refers  to  the  position  as  “New  Age  Relativism.”    
3  For  some  defences  of  truth-­‐‑relativism  about  predicates  of  personal  taste,  see  Lasersohn  (2005),  
Stephenson  (2007)  and  Kölbel  (2003).  Cf.  Cappelen  &  Hawthorne  (2010),  Ch.  4,  for  some  recent  
opposition.  
4  See  (Egan  2007;  Egan,  Hawthorne  &  Weatherson  2007;  Stephenson  2007  and  MacFarlane  2011c).    
5  For  defences  of  truth-­‐‑relativism  about  knowledge  attributions,  see  Richard  (2004);  MacFarlane  (2005;  
2010).  
6  See  MacFarlane  (2003).    
7  See  Richard  (2004).  
8  For  example,  Weatherson  (2006).  
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point  out,  the  idea  of  the  same  proposition  being  true  for  Sam  but  not  for  Dean  runs  deeply  
contrary  to  our  ordinary  thinking  about  the  contents  of  thought  and  talk—particularly,  that  
the  objects  of  thought  and  talk  (i.e.  propositions)  bear  truth  and  falsity  as  monadic  properties.  
There  would   have   to   be  very   good   reason   to   give   up   this   elegant   and  pre-­‐‑philosophically  
intuitive  picture.    
   MacFarlane   thinks   there  are  plenty  of  good  reasons,  and  although  he   is  not  by  any  
means   the   only   New   Relativist,   his   defences   of   truth-­‐‑relativism   across   a   spectrum   of  
domains  of  discourse  have  been  the  most  sophisticated  in  the  literature;  accordingly,  I’ll  be  
considering   the   role   of   disagreement   in   the   truth-­‐‑relativist’s   argument   broadly   on  
MacFarlane’s  own  terms,  and  again,  by  focusing  on  predicates  of  personal   taste   (hereafter,  
P-­‐‑utterances)   as   the   representative  area  of  discourse—though   I  will   at   times  use  examples  
from  discourse  concerning  epistemic  modals.  
As   MacFarlane   sees   things,   disagreement   and   subjectivity   are   twin   desiderata   that  
must  be  accommodated  by  any  theory  of  the  truth-­‐‑conditions  of  P-­‐‑utterances  (and  in  other  
domains   of   discourse   where   truth-­‐‑relativism   is   defended).   To   be   explicit,   a   theory   of   the  
truth-­‐‑conditions  of  P-­‐‑utterances  succeeds  only  if  accounting  for  both      
  
Subjectivity:   how   the   truth  of  P-­‐‑utterances  depends   in  part   on  how   things   are  with  
some  subject  not  explicitly  mentioned;  and    
Disagreement:  how  when  some  subject  A  makes  a  P-­‐‑utterance  “ɸ”  and  B  replies  “Not  
ɸ”,  this  exchange  constitutes  a  genuine  disagreement.  
  
   Toward  this  end,  the  contextualist  fares  quite  well  in  so  far  as  the  goal  is  to  preserve  
subjectivity.  For  the  contextualist,  the  proposition  “Kalamata  olives  are  tasty”,  uttered  by  A,  
encodes   A’s   standards;   accordingly,   the   proposition   expressed   by   this   utterance   is  
(something   like)   “Kalamata   olives   are   tasty   (to  A).”   This   already   is   a   mark   in   favour   of  
contextualism  over  invariantist  approaches,  which  fail  to  account  for  how  “Kalamata  olives  
are   tasty”   is   (when   true)   true   in   part   due   to   facts   about   the   utterer’s   own   tastes.   The  
contextualist   appears   to   be   in   trouble,   though,   when   it   comes   to   the   second   desiderata:  
preserving  the  insight  that  there  can  be  genuine  P-­‐‑disagreements  of  the  form:  
  
A:  ɸ  (e.g.  Miniature  golf  is  fun)  
B:  ~  ɸ  (e.g.  Miniature  golf  is  not  fun)  
  
For   the   contextualist,  A’s  utterance  expresses   the  proposition   that  miniature  golf   is  
fun   to  A,  while  B’s   assertion   expresses   the  proposition   that  miniature   golf   is   not   fun   to  B;  
accordingly,  for  the  contextualist,  there  is  no  commonality  of  content  about  which  A  and  B  
disagree.  So  the  contextualist  has  no  way  to  account  for  genuine  P-­‐‑disagreements.  Or  so  the  
argument  goes.    
As  MacFarlane  (and  the  contextualist)  recognizes,  the  contextualist  is  not  dead  in  the  
water   at   this   point.   Drawing   from   Lewis   (1989),   the   contextualist   could—following   here  
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DeRose   (2002)—invoke   the   shared   scoreboard  analogy   in   an   effort   to   save  disagreement9.  On  
this   analogy,   the   relevant   standard   in   play   is   whatever   standard   is   operative   in   the  
conversational  context,  and  this  standard  can  shift  during  the  course  of  the  conversation  as  
different  conversational  moves  are  made.  Consider  here  the  case  of  knowledge-­‐‑attributions:  
once  (say)  a  particularly  scary  sceptical  scenario  is  introduced,  the  standard  operative  in  the  
conversational  context  raises,  and  claims  of  the  form  “S  knows  p”  encode  (after  the  scenario  
is   introduced)   that  standard;  because  A   and  B   can   coherently   assert   and  deny  knowledge-­‐‑
attributions  relative  to  the  common  standard  operant  in  the  conversational  context  (so  long  
as   they   are   keeping   an   eye   to   the   scoreboard),  we   can  make   sense   of  A   and  B   genuinely  
disagreeing.    
There   are   (at   least)   two   problems   with   this   initially   promising   approach   for   the  
contextualist   to   ‘regain’  disagreement.  The   first   is   that   it   is  not  at   all   clear  how   the   shared  
scoreboard-­‐‑strategy—while   perhaps   plausible   in   the   case   of   knowledge-­‐‑attributions   and  
perhaps   also   in   cases   of   epistemic  modals—would  work   in  P-­‐‑discourse  where   it’s   unclear  
what  if  any  the  standard  operative  in  the  apparent  disagreement  would  be.  Modifying  here  
an  example  from  Cappelen  &  Hawthorne,  suppose  Vinny  (the  vulture)  says,  “Rotting  flesh  
is   delicious!”   while   Gordon   Ramsay   replies   that   it   is   “(Expletive)   terrible!”   It   is,   at   best,  
unclear  how,  for  the  contextualist,  reference  to  the  shared  scoreboard  analogy  is  supposed  to  
save   disagreement   here.   But   even   if   the   shared   scoreboard   strategy   could   be   effectively  
employed   here,   a   bigger   worry   looms:   as   MacFarlane   notes,   such   a   strategy   could   (in  
principle)   only   explain   only   intra-­‐‑conversational   (but   not   inter-­‐‑conversational)   disagreement.  
Here’s  MacFarlane:  
  
Once  the  importance  of  accounting  for  disagreement  has  been  conceded,  one  cannot  limit  
oneself  to  disagreement  within  conversations.    And  it  is  hopeless  to  widen  the  bounds  of  
“conversations”  as  needed  to  make  all  disagreement  intraconversational.  For  it  is  only  if  
conversations  are  bounded  and  relatively  self-­‐‑contained  that  we  can  really  make  sense  of  
the  idea  of  a  shared  scoreboard.  (MacFarlane  2007,  7.)  
  
Just   as   there   is   no   apparent   ‘shared   scoreboard’   in   the   cases  where  P-­‐‑claims   come  
from  wildly  different  perspectives  (as  in  the  case  of  Vinny  and  Gordon  Ramsay),  there’s  no  
shared   scoreboard   when   disagreements   are   interconversational.   What,   after   all,   would   a  
shared  scoreboard  amount  to  in  inter-­‐‑conversational  disagreement?  
Here  it  is  worth  briefly  considering  ‘Eavesdropper’  cases:  one  subject  overhears,  and  
denies,  a  claim  made  in  a  conversational  context  of  which  she  is  not  a  recognised  member.  
Eavesdropper  cases  have  been  especially  forceful  in  suggesting  that  the  contextualist  cannot  
account  for  disagreement  in  cases  where  the  truth  of  an  epistemic  modal   is  at  issue  (and  this  
has   been   cited   as   an   argument   in   favour   of   truth-­‐‑relativist   semantics   for   discourse   about  
epistemic  modality).  A  paradigmatic   example  of   a   claim  expressing  an  epistemic  modal   is  
                                                                                                              
9  Cf.  Sundell  (2011).  Thanks  to  an  anonymous  referee  for  drawing  my  attention  to  this  reference.  
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the  claim  A  might  be  F;  whether  an  utterance  of  this  claim  is  true  depends  on  whether  F  is  an  
epistemic  possibility   for  some  relevant   individual  or  group—that   is,  F  must  not  be  ruled  out  
by  what   some   individual   or   group   knows10.  As   for  which   individual   or   group   is   relevant  
here,  Egan  (2011,  2),  and  Weatherson  &  Egan  (2012,  4)  point  out  that  it  depends,  and  (as  the  
truth-­‐‑relativist   suggests,   contra   the   contextualist)  what   it  depends  on  does  not   seem   to  be  
uniquely   determined   by   the   context   of   utterance.   Consider   here   a   simple   eavesdropping  
case,  a  variation  on  John  Hawthorne’s  (2007:  92)  example:  
  
EAVESDROPPER:   Peeking   out   of   my   window,   I   overhear   Rodney   say   to   Jared,  
“Purdue   might   beat   Kansas   in   the   second   round   of   the   NCAA   basketball  
Tournament!”  Purdue  was  in  fact  leading  throughout  until  Kansas  made  a  very  late  
game-­‐‑winning   comeback,  which   I   know   about,   but   they   don’t   (they   quit  watching  
while  I  remained  in  my  flat  vigorously  clicking  ‘refresh’  on  ESPN).  Even  though  it’s  
compatible  with  what  they  know  that  Purdue  beat  Kansas,  I  say  to  myself  that  what  
Rodney  said  was  incorrect.  
  
This  looks  like  a  legitimate  (albeit  inter-­‐‑conversational)  disagreement  about  whether  
Purdue  might  beat  Kansas,  but  the  contextualist  seems  to  have  no  obvious  way  to  account  
for  it.  If  the  relevant  individual  or  group  always  (as  DeRose  suggests)  includes  the  speaker11,  
then   disagreement   is   lost   because   Rodney’s   assertion   expresses   an   epistemic   possibility  
relative   to  a  body  of  knowledge   that   is  his   (or  perhaps  his  and   Jared’s),  and  vice-­‐‑versa   for  
me.   (After   all,   I   am   inclined   to   agree   that   Purdue’s   winning   is   an   epistemic   possibility  
relative   to   what   they   know.)   And,   again,   there   is   no   shared   scoreboard   to   make   use   of  
because  this  conversation  is  inter-­‐‑conversational;  thus,  the  contextualist  fails  to  capture  any  
clear  sense  in  which  Rodney  and  I  disagree  about  whether  Purdue  might  win.  
At   this   point,   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   turns   a   disagreement-­‐‑based   argument   against  
contextualism   into   a   disagreement-­‐‑based   argument   for   truth-­‐‑relativism.   While   the  
invariantist  is  equipped  to  preserve  disagreement  without  subjectivity,  and  the  contextualist  
seems  equipped  to  preserve  subjectivity  but  not  disagreement,  the  relativist  claims  you  have  
it  both  ways:  both  subjectivity  and  disagreement.  First  subjectivity:  as  Stojanovic  (2009,  691)  
succinctly  notes,  while   the   contextualist  preserved   subjectivity  by  modelling   (for   example,  
with  predicates  of  personal   taste)   the   judge  parameter  as  an   implicit  argument   to   the   taste  
predicate,   the   [truth]-­‐‑relativist   account   models   it   as   a   parameter   of   the   circumstances   of  
evaluation.12  
                                                                                                              
10  Or,  perhaps,  by  whatever  is  within  an  agent’s  epistemic  reach.  As  Egan  (2007,  11)  suggests,  “It  might  
be  the  case  that  P  is  true  iff  it’s  compatible  with  all  of  the  facts  that  are  within  some  group’s  epistemic  
reach  that  P,  where  what  it  takes  to  be  within  one’s  epistemic  reach  can  vary  across  contexts.  
11  See  Egan,  Hawthorne  &  Weatherson  (2005)  for  further  problems  for  DeRose’s  speaker  inclusion  
constraint.  
12  Since  truth-­‐‑relativism  is  prominent  in  both  predicates  of  personal  taste  and  about  epistemic  modals,  
let  X    represent  either  area  of  discourse.  As  MacFarlane  puts  it,  the  subjectivity  consists  in  the  fact  that  
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Whether  “John  might  be  at  the  store”  is  true,  when  evaluated  by  S,  depends  in  part  
on  what  S’s  knowledge  rules  out;  and  whether  “Roller  coasters  are  fun”  is  true,  as  evaluated  
by  S,  depends  in  part  on  what  S  judges  to  be  fun13.  It  should  be  obvious  now  why,  if  truth-­‐‑
relativism   can   also   really   preserve   disagreement   (which   we’ll   consider   shortly),   then   the  
disagreements   that  are  preserved  will  be   faultless:   in   the  Eavesdropper  case,  while  Rodney  
and   I   seem   to  disagree  about  whether  “Purdue  might  win,”  neither  of  us   is   at   fault,   or   as  
Kölbel  (2003;  2004)  puts  it,  neither  of  us  has  “made  a  mistake.”  The  same  would  of  course  be  
the   case  with   predicates   of   personal   taste,   and   the   fact   that   neither   you   nor   I   seem   to   be  
mistaken  when   asserting   and  denying   (respectively)   “Rollercoasters   are   fun”   is   an   insight  
Kölbel  thinks  is  both  a  ubiquitous  one  and  one  that  only  a  truth-­‐‑relativist  can  preserve.  
So   subjectivity   (and   by   extension   faultlessness,   in   apparent   disagreements)   is  
preserved.   But   is   genuine   disagreement   really   preserved?   This   is   a   more   complicated  
question.  The  first  thing  the  relativist  will  draw  attention  to  is  the  sense  in  which  the  truth-­‐‑
relativist  preserves  disagreement  “better”  than  the  contextualist.  On  the  surface,  this  seems  
right.  When  Vinny   and  Gordon  Ramsay  disagree   about  whether   rotting   flesh   is  delicious,  
the   contextualist,   by   viewing   Vinny   and   Gordon   as   expressing   propositions   that   encode  
their  standards,  respectively,  is  forced  to  say  that  there  is  no  one  proposition  Vinny  asserts  
and   Gordon   denies.   Because   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   preserves   subjectivity   not   by   viewing  
‘delicious’   as   a   hidden   indexical,   but   rather,   by   including   a   standards   parameter   in   the  
circumstances   of   evaluation,   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   allows   Vinny   and   Gordon   to   affirm   and  
deny  the  same  standards-­‐‑neutral  proposition  (i.e.  Rotting  flesh  is  delicious),  respectively.  
Two   things   should  now  be  obvious:   firstly,   that   if  we   can’t  make   sense  of   genuine  
disagreement  about  the  sort  of  content  the  truth-­‐‑relativist  claims  is  being  ‘disagreed  upon,’  
then   the  motivation   for  endorsing   truth-­‐‑relativism  over  contextualism  (across   the  domains  
of   discourse   where   truth-­‐‑relativism   stakes   its   claim)   is   vitiated.   Truth-­‐‑relativism   fails   to  
account   for   disagreement   if   what   it   accounts   for   isn’t   genuine   disagreement.   Secondly,   it  
should   be   obvious   that   the   interesting   ramification   for   debates   in   social   epistemology  
(specifically,   in   the  epistemology  of  disagreement)  will  be  whether  doxastic  revision   in  the  
face  of  truth-­‐‑relativist-­‐‑style  disagreement  with  a  recognised  epistemic  peer  is  something  that  
we   can  make   sense  of   as   ever  being   rationally   required.   If  not,   truth-­‐‑relativist  disagreement  
would  seem  to  lack  the  sort  of  epistemic  significance  disagreements  as  such  are  supposed  to  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
the  'ʹX-­‐‑neutral'ʹ  proposition  (i.e.  “John  might  be  at  the  store”  or  “Roller  coasters  are  fun”)  which  A  
asserts  and  B  denies  has  a  truth  value  only  relative  to  an  assessment  parameter;  as  such,  either  of  
these  propositions  can  be  true  for  A  and  false  for  B.  Subjectivity  is  preserved  then  because  it  is  
preserved  that  the  truth  of  these  claims  depends  in  part  on  how  things  are  for  some  agent  not  
explicitly  mentioned.  
13  This  is  somewhat  oversimplistic;  as  Lasersohn  (2005)  points  out,  in  discourse  about  predicates  of  
personal  taste,  we  can  distinguish  between  autocentric  and  exocentric  perspectives,  the  latter  of  
which  will  be  ones  where  we  the  relevant  standards  at  play  in  the  context  of  evaluation  will  be  the  
standards  of  someone  other  than  the  asserter.  Consider,  for  example,  a  case  where  a  man  (having  
taken  his  5-­‐‑year-­‐‑old  to  the  carnival)  says  to  his  wife  (in  the  presence  of  his  son),  that  the  “The  
rollercoaster  was  fun,  but  and  other  kiddie  rides  weren’t  fun.”  
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have.  We’ll  engage  with   this   latter   issue  after  more  carefully  assessing   the  nature  of   truth-­‐‑
relativist  disagreement.  
  
3.  Centred-­‐‑content  disagreement,  and  the  practice  of  challenging  assertions  
Lewis  (1980)  and  Kaplan  (1989)  showed  that  truth  can  be  relative  to  a  context  of  evaluation  
that   includes  world,   time  and   location  parameters.  As  Kaplan   (particularly   in  his  work  on  
indexicals)  showed  us,  the  need  for  particular  parameters  in  the  circumstance  of  evaluation  
is   a   function   of   the   non-­‐‑specificity   of   certain   propositional   contents  with   respect   to  world,  
time  and  location.  Here’s  Kaplan:  
  
  “A  circumstance  will usually  include  a  possible  state  or  history  of  the  world,  a  time,  and  
perhaps   other   features   as   well.   The   amount   of   information   we   require   from   a  
circumstance   is   linked   to   the   degree   of   specificity   of   contents and   thus   to   the   kinds   of  
operators  in  the  language...  (1989:  502,  my  italics)  
  
MacFarlane,   as  well   as  Cappelen  and  Hawthorne14,  view   truth-­‐‑relativism  as  expanding  on  
this   insight,  by   ‘proliferating’   the  parameters   in   the  circumstances  of  evaluation   to   include  
(as  Cappelen  &  Hawthorne  (2010,  10)  put  it),  ‘exotic  parameters’.  Here’s  MacFarlane’s  own  
characterisation  of  this  sort  of  parameter  proliferation  (which  corresponds  with  a  widening  
of  the  contents  that  are,  for  some  parameter  α,  ‘α  -­‐‑neutral’:  
  
  Taking  this  line  of  thought  a  little  farther,  the  relativist  might  envision  contents  that  are  
“sense-­‐‑of-­‐‑humor   neutral”   or   “standard-­‐‑of-­‐‑taste”   neutral”   or   “epistemic-­‐‑state”   neutral,”  
and  circumstances  of  evaluation  that  include  parameters  for  a  sense  of  humor,  a  standard  
of   taste  or   an  epistemic   state.  This  move  would  open  up   room   for   the   truth  value  of   a  
proposition  to  vary  with   these  “subjective”  factors   in  much  the  same  way  that   it  varies  
with  the  world  of  evaluation.  The  very  same  proposition-­‐‑-­‐‑say,  that  apples  are  delicious-­‐‑-­‐‑
could   be   true   with   respect   to   one   standard   of   taste,   false   with   respect   to   another.”  
(MacFarlane  2007:  6-­‐‑7)  
  
   What   do   two   people   disagree   about   when   disagreeing   about   a   (for   example)  
‘standard-­‐‑of-­‐‑taste-­‐‑neutral’   proposition?   Such   a   proposition   is  what   some   refer   to   a   centred  
proposition,  which—following  Egan—is   true  only  relative   to  a   triple   that   includes  <world,  
                                                                                                              
14  In  their  monograph-­‐‑length  argument  against  truth-­‐‑relativism  (which  they  call  ‘analytic  relativism’),  
Cappelen  &  Hawthorne  write:  “Contemporary  Analytic  relativists  reason  as  follows:  ‘Lewis  and  
Kaplan  have  shown  that  we  need  to  relativize  truth  to  triples  of  <world,  time,  location>.  Hence  in  a  
way,  anyone  who  follows  Lewis  and  Kaplan  is  already  a  relativist.  There  are  only  truth  and  falsity  
relative  to  settings  along  these  three  parameters,  and  so  there  is  no  such  thing  as  truth  simpliciter.  
But,  having  already  started  down  this  road,  why  not  exploit  these  strategies  further?  In  particular,  by  
adding  new  and  exotic  parameters  into  the  circumstances  of  evaluation,  we  can  allow  the  contents  of  
thought  and  talk  to  be  non-­‐‑specific  (in  Kaplan’s  sense)  along  dimensions  other  than  world,  time  and  
location,”  (2009:  10).  
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time,   individual>,  where   the   ‘individual’  parameter   is   fixed  by  a   fact  about   the  evaluating  
subject.  So  the  centred  proposition  ‘disagreed  about’  by  A  and  B  can  get  a  truth  value  of  true  
relative  to  <w,  t,  i>a  and  a  truth  value  of  false  relative  to  <w,  t,  i>b  even  when  <w,  t,  i>a  and    <w,  
t,  i>a    differ  only  with  respect  to  the  parameter  fixed  by  A’s  and  B’s  standards  (respectively).  
So,   again,   what   do   A   and   B   disagree   about  when   asserting   and   denying   respectively   a  
centred  proposition?   Isn’t   the   question   ‘is   [insert   centred  proposition]   such   and   so?’  more  
sensible   for  either   to  ask   (and  assess)   in  soliloquy  and   less  sensible   for  either   to   ‘debate’15?    
This   is   a   tenuous   predicament   for   the   truth   relativist,   and   MacFarlane   knows   it. 16  
Accordingly,  MacFarlane  rejects  the  simple  view  of  disagreement  according  to  which  A  and  
B  disagree  if  there  is  a  proposition  p  that  A  accepts  and  B  rejects.  The  simple  view  (vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  
centred   content)   really   doesn’t   seem   to   capture   genuine   disagreement.   Ragnar   Francén,  
when  critiquing  Kölbel’s  contention  to  the  contrary,  puts  the  worry  well:  
  
Kölbel  is  right  that  on  his  view,  when  Kant  says  that  punishing  innocent  Irwin  is  wrong  
and  Smart  says  that  this  is  not  so,  the  propositions  they  assert  cannot  both  be  true  at  one  
circumstance   of   evaluation   (moral   perspective).   But   this   does   not   mean   that   they  
disagree.   In   analogy   with   Jane’s   and   June’s   assertions,   Smart’s   and   Kant’s   assertions  
concern  different  circumstances  of  evaluation,  different  moral  perspectives.  It  might  very  
well   be   that   they   agree   that   punishing   innocent   Irwin   is   wrong   at   Kant’s   moral  
perspective  and  that  punishing  innocent  Irwin  is  not  wrong  at  Smart’s  moral  perspective.  
(Francén  2008,  112,  cited  also  in  Dreier  2009,  99).  
  
   MacFarlane  himself,   in   rejecting   that   two  people  disagree   just   so   long  as   there   is   a  
proposition   that   one   accepts   and   the   other   rejects,   offers   a   more   sophisticated   accuracy-­‐‑
based  account  of  disagreement,  supplemented  by  a  formal  account  of  accuracy:  
  
Disagreement   (MacFarlane):  Two  parties  disagree   (as   assessed   from  context  C)   if:   (i)  
There  is  a  proposition  that  one  party  accepts  and  the  other  rejects,  and  (ii)  
The  acceptance  and  the  rejection  cannot  both  be  accurate  (as  assessed  from  C).  
  
I   will   spare   the   details   here   of   MacFarlane’s   account   of   perspectival   accuracy   on  
which   this  account  of  disagreement   is  premised17.  This   is  because,  given  what  MacFarlane  
ultimately  concedes  about  his  account,  we  can  set  aside  the  matter  of  whether  the  account  is  
                                                                                                              
15  Perhaps  as  sensible  as  it  is  to  debate  what  fixes  the  judge  parameter  when  it’s  you  that  is  evaluating  
the  proposition;  and  so,  perhaps  as  sensible  as  debating  what  your  own  standards  are.  
16  Cf.  Egan  2011  for  an  assertion-­‐‑based  attempt,  on  behalf  of  the  truth-­‐‑relativist,  to  take  this  problem  
on.  
17  MacFarlane  views  Perspectival  Accuracy  as  a  component  of  his  account  of  disagreement,  which  he  
calls  Can’t  Both  Be  Right.  According  to  Perspectival  Accuracy:  An  acceptance  (rejection)  of  a  proposition  
p  at  a  context  Cu  is  accurate  (as  assessed  from  a  Context  CA)  iff  p  is  true  (false)  at  the  circumstance  Wcu,  
SCA  where  Wcu  =  the  world  of  Cu  and  SCA  =  the  standard  of  taste  of  the  assessor  at  CA.  
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‘counterexample-­‐‑free.’  My  aim  at  this  point18  isn’t   to  assess  whether  truth  relativism  gives  a  
correct  account  of  disagreement,  but   rather,   to   consider  what   implications   such  an  account  
would  have  for  debates  about  disagreement  in  social  epistemology.  And  here,  what  is  more  
important  than  his  formal  account  of  accuracy  is  the  relationship  he  thinks  accuracy  (in  his  
account)   bears   to   the   practice   of   challenging   assertions   that   is   part   and   parcel   with  
disagreement  in  practice.  
On  this  point,  recent  work  by  James  Dreier   (2009,  102)  reveals  some  very  awkward  
results   for   the   truth-­‐‑relativist.   Following   Dreier,   we   can   characterise   how   challenging  
assertions  is  supposed  to  work  on  a  relativized  account  of  accuracy.  
  
Accuracy/Challenge:   (i)   one   is   entitled   to   challenge   an   assertion   when   one   has   good  
grounds   for   thinking   that   the   assertion   was   not   accurate   (relative   to   the   context   of  
assessment  one  occupies  in  issuing  the  challenge),  and  (ii)  a  successful  response  to  such  a  
challenge  consists  in  a  demonstration  that  the  assertion  was,  in  fact,  accurate  (relative  to  
the  context  of  assessment  one  occupies  in  giving  a  response’)  
  
Against   this   background,   Dreier   (2009,   102)   assesses   how   this   Brandom-­‐‑style  
challenge/response   game,  which  MacFarlane   (2007,   29)   admits   ‘can   look   like   a   pretty   silly  
game’,  would  work  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  relativized  accuracy:  
  
Well,  we  could  play   this  game.   I   shout,   “It   is   throbby   in  here,”  and  you  challenge.  You  
assess   “It   is   throbby   in   here”   from   your   own   perspective   and,   pain   free,   find   it   badly  
defective  (inaccurate);  you  find  you  were  entitled  to  your  challenge.  I  now  roll  my  eyes,  
place  my  head  in  my  hands,  grope  around  for  Ibuprofen,  thus  demonstrating  that  from  
my   perspective   my   assertion   was   entirely   accurate;   I   have   successfully   (from   my  
perspective)  met  the  challenge.  We  could  play  this  game.  But  it  would  be  a  bad  game.    
  
Dreier   (2009,   102-­‐‑3)   goes   on   to   suggest   that   not   only   is   this   a   bad   game,   but   even  worse,  
perhaps  a  nonsensical  game.    
  
The  game  as  we  were  playing  it  seems  not  to  make  any  kind  of  conversational  sense  at  
all.  In  this  way  it  is  quite  different  from  other  kinds  of  pointless  conversational  games  we  
might  play…  [other  pointless  games]  are  conversationally  intelligible  even  if  their  critics  
are   right   about   their   pointlessness.   When   you   say   that   human   beings   are   four-­‐‑
dimensional   and   I   say   we   are   three   dimensional,   this   at   least   makes   sense   as   a  
disagreement  even  if  there  isn’t  anything  either  of  us  can  say  to  budge  the  other  form  his  
position…  but  when  I  insist  that  it  is  throbby  in  here  and  you  reply  that  it  isn’t  the  least  
                                                                                                              
18  In  §5,  I’ll  give  some  considerations  to  suppose  not  that  the  truth-­‐‑relativist  account  of  disagreement  
is  ‘incorrect’,  but  rather,  that  it  is  not  epistemically  significant  in  the  way  we  should  expect  genuine  
disagreements  to  be.  
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bit  throbby,  all  that  is  happening  is  that  I  have  a  headache,  and  you  do  not,  and  we  both  
know  this…  and  there  is  no  intelligible  sense  in  which  we  disagree.  
  
Perhaps   Dreier   is   right   that   these   faultless   ‘disagreements’   are   nonsensical,   perhaps   he’s   not.  
They   do   seem   to   be   practically   pointless,   and   for   good   reason:   the   alleged   disagreement   here  
lacks  any  epistemically  significance  for  either  party.  Genuine  disagreements  are  hardly  pointless  in  
practice   in   part   because   they   serve   the   function   of   playing   epistemically   significant   roles   in  
social-­‐‑epistemic   practice,   as   we’ll   see   in   §4.   In   §5,   we’ll   consider   whether   truth-­‐‑relativist  
disagreement   can  play   the   sort  of   epistemically   significant   role  genuine  disagreements  are  
taken  to  play.  
  
4.  Disagreement  in  social  epistemology:  conformism  versus  non-­‐‑conformism  
Is   the  mere   fact   that   you   and   I   disagree   about   p   epistemically   significant   in   the   following  
way:   if   I   previously   believed   p,   and   then   find   out   that   you   believe   ~p,   I   am   rationally  
required   to   revise   (i.e   lower   the  degree  of  my  belief19)  my  belief   that  p?  A  quick  and  easy  
answer  is   ‘no’,   if   I   (for  example)  know  that  my  evidence  is  better  than  yours,  or  perhaps,  I  
know  that  you  are  delusional,  or   in  some  way  cognitively  defective  on  the  matter  at  hand.  
Such   asymmetry   with   respect   to   our   epistemic   standings   to   p   prior   to   disagreement   is  
enough   to   make   our   disagreement   epistemically   insignificant   with   respect   to   whether,  
rationally,   I   am   required   to   revise  my  belief   that  p.  The   fact   of   our  disagreement   (in   such  
circumstances)  doesn’t  provide  me  with  any  rational  grounds  for  supposing  that  I  am  wrong  
about  p.  
But   what   if,   prior   to   disagreeing   about   whether   p,   we   recognise   each   other   as  
cognitive  equals,  or   epistemic  peers  with   respect   to  whether  p?  What   then?  This  depends   in  
part   on   what   epistemic   peerhood   involves.   Feldman   and   Lackey   suggest   that   we   are  
epistemic   peers   (vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   p)   if   we   are   on   a   par   with   respect   to   our   cognitive   ability   and  
evidence  relevant  to  determining  whether  p20.  If  I  recognise  you  as  an  epistemic  peer  prior  to  
a   disagreement  with   you   about   p,   recognition   of   this   fact   of   disagreement   is   perhaps   not  
insignificant  with  respect  to  what  rationality  requires  of  my  doxastic  attitude  with  respect  to  
p.  Adam  Elga,   a   proponent   (along  with   Feldman   and  David  Christensen)   of  what   Lackey  
calls  the  conformist  view21,  says:    
  
                                                                                                              
19  Or  perhaps  withhold  judgment  with  respect  to  p.  
20  Lackey  calls  these  criteria  for  epistemic  peerhood  evidential  equality  and  cognitive  equality.  On  her  
articulation:    Evidential  equality:  A  and  B  are  evidential  equals  relative  to  the  question  whether  p  when  
A  and  B  are  equally  familiar  with  the  evidence  and  arguments  that  bear  on  the  question  whether  p.  
Cognitive  equality:  A  and  B  are  cognitive  equals  relative  to  the  question  whether  p  when  A  and  B  are  
equally  competent,  intelligent,  and  fair-­‐‑minded  in  their  abilities  to  assess  the  evidence  and  arguments  
that   bear   on   the   question   whether   p.  Cf.   Earl   Conee   (2009)   “Peerage,”  Episteme   6   (3):313-­‐‑323   for   a  
thorough  discussion  of  epistemic  peerhood.  
21  Christensen  (2007)  calls  this  the  ‘conciliatory’  view.  
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On  my  usage,  you  count  your  friend  as  an  epistemic  peer  with  respect  to  an  about  to-­‐‑be-­‐‑
judged   claim   if   and   only   if   you   think   that,   conditional   on   the   two   of   you   disagreeing  
about  the  claim,  the  two  of  you  are  equally  likely  to  be  mistaken.  Elga  (2007,  487)  
  
And   once   this   is   supposed,   as   Elga   (2007,   478)   sees   it,   the   rational   thing   to   do   is  
straightforward:   you   should   give   [the   recognised   epistemic   peer’s]   conclusions   the   same  
weight  as  your  own.  Here’s  Elga:  
  
Suppose  that  before  evaluating  a  claim,  you  think  that  you  and  your  friend  are  equally  
likely   to   evaluate   it   correctly.  When  you   find  out   that   your   friend  disagrees  with  your  
verdict,  how  likely  should  you  think  it  that  you  are  correct?  The  equal  weight  view  says:  
50%.  
  
Elga’s   is  a  strong  view  of  conformism.  More  moderate  versions  of  conformism  will  
require  some  doxastic  revision  in  the  face  of  disagreement  with  a  recognised  epistemic  peer.  
David   Christensen   (2007,   4)   argues   that   the   fact   of   disagreement   with   a   (recognised)  
epistemic   peer   rationally   requires   me   to   ‘change   my   degree   of   confidence   significantly’  
toward   that   of   my   peer,   and   vice-­‐‑versa,   while,   according   to   Richard   Feldman,   what  
rationality  requires  (in  the  face  of  recognized  epistemic  peer  disagreement)  is  that  I  suspend  
judgment.  Feldman  and  Elga  (and  to  a   large  extent  Christensen),   thus,   take  something  like  
an  ‘all  or  nothing’  view:  what  rationality  requires  of  me,  upon  finding  out  that  an  epistemic  
peer   believes   contrary   to  me   about  whether   p,   is   doxastic   revision   to   the   extent   that   I   no  
longer   maintain   positive   belief   that   p.   If   this   is   right,   an   important   implication   of   the  
conformist  position  is  the  denial  of  the  claim  that  there  can  be  any  reasonable  disagreement  
among  mutually  recognised  epistemic  peers  (at  least  in  situations  of  full  disclosure).    
   This  picture  is  rejected  by  what  Jennifer  Lackey  (2007,  4-­‐‑7)  calls  non-­‐‑conformists  (e.g.  
Kelly  (2005);  van  Inwagen  (1996)).  Non-­‐‑conformists,  specifically,  reject   the  view  that  one  is  
rationally   required   to   revise   one’s   belief   in   the   face   of   recognised   peer   disagreement,   and  
consequently,  unlike   the  conformist,  allow  for   the  possibility  of  rational  or   reasonable  peer  
disagreement.  Who’s  right,  the  conformist  or  the  non-­‐‑conformist?    
   As  literature  over  the  past  five  years  has  shown22,  there  is  no  quick  and  easy  answer.  
Offering  one  is  more  than  I  want  to  attempt  here.  However,  I  do  want  to  draw  attention,  as  
Lackey  has,   to   the   fact   that  certain  cases  are   typically  adduced   in   favour  of   the  conformist  
and   certain   others   in   favour   of   the   non-­‐‑conformist.   But   this   very   fact,   I   think,   supports  
Lackey’s  contention  that  we  have  some  reason  to  reject  the  following  sort  of  principle,  which  
she  calls  uniformity:  
  
                                                                                                              
22  See  Disagreement,  ed.  Feldman  &  Warfield,  (2010)  for  an  anthology  of  important  recent  work  on  the  




Uniformity:   Disagreement  with   epistemic   peers   functions   the   same   epistemically   in  
all  circumstances.  
  
   Both   conformism  and  non-­‐‑conformism  presuppose  uniformity.  But   if   uniformity   is  
false,   then  there  is  scope  for   intermediate  positions  (such  as  what  Lackey  endorses  herself)  
according  to  which  we  allow  that,  in  some  cases,  the  rationally  appropriate  thing  to  do  in  the  
face   of   recognised   peer   disagreement   is   to   revise   one’s   belief;   in   others,   it   is   rationally  
appropriate   to  remain  steadfast23.  The  challenge  for  developing  an   intermediate  position   is  
to   spell   out   in   some   principled   way   what   grounds   different   rational   requirements   in  
response   to   recognised   peer   disagreement   in   different   cases.   I’m   interested   here   not   in  
evaluating   Lackey’s   preferred   intermediate   account24,   but   rather,   to   suggest   that   if   some  
category   of   cases   seems   to   predominantly   support   conformism,   then   this   is   a   prima   facie  
reason  to  think  that  rationality  requires  at  least  some  degree  of  doxastic  revision  in  this  class  
of   cases,   even   if   there   is   some   other   class   of   cases   that   typically   squares   better   with   non-­‐‑
conformism.  
A  rather  wide  class  of  cases  that  has  been  popular  among  conformists  is  the  (broad)  
class   of   cases   that   include   disagreements   between   recognised   epistemic   peers   concerning  
controversial  subject  matter.25  Let’s   say   a   subject  matter  S   is   controversial   to   the   extent   that  
epistemic  peers  tend  to  disagree  in  that  area26.  Such  areas  include  exclude  (for  instance)  basic  
arithmetic,   the   current   time,   physical   laws,   geography,   and   to   a   large   extent   empirical  
science   and   include   (among   other   areas)   politics,   religion,   philosophy   and—most   relevant  
for  our  purposes—claims  of  taste.    
   It  should  be  uncontroversial  that  claims  characteristic  of  these  areas  are  controversial,  
and  apparent  disagreement  about  them  is  rampant.  One  might  be  tempted  to  reflect,  though,  
on   this   last   suggestion   and   point   out:   “While   it’s   fair   enough   to   imagine   A   and   B   as  
                                                                                                              
23  An  example  of  a  case  that  would  plausibly  support  a  non-­‐‑conformist  approach  would  be  one  where  
the  previously  recognized  epistemic  peer  disagrees  with  you  about  something  for  which  your  
epistemic  justification  is  overwhelming,  direct  and  immediate.  For  example,  suppose    
24  See  Lackey’s  “A  Justificationist  Account  of  the  Epistemic  Significance  of  Peer  Disagreement.”  
25  Thanks  to  an  anonymous  referee  for  pointing  out  that  controversial  issues  have  formed  some  of  the  
core  examples  for  all  participants  in  the  literature  on  peer  disagreement,  whatever  their  preferred  
view.  Perhaps  this  is,  to  some  degree,  a  result  of  non-­‐‑conformists  attempting  to  meet  the  challenge  
posed  by  conformists,  when  the  challenge  is  presented  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  controversial  subject  matter  (a  la  
Feldman).  However,  as  the  reviewer  points  out,  this  isn’t  always  the  case.  Whether  and  to  what  extent  
controversial  subject  matter  is  comparatively  more  fertile  ground  for  the  conformist  than  for  the  non-­‐‑
conformist  is  an  interesting  philosophical  question  in  its  own  right.  For  the  present  purposes,  I  do  not  
need  to  weigh  in  here;  my  position  depends  only  on  the  weaker  claim  that  controversial  subject  
matter  is  typically  used  to  support  the  non-­‐‑conformist  verdict,  and  this  is  so  regardless  of  whether  
non-­‐‑conformists  appeal  in  some  cases  to  similar  kinds  of  cases.    
26  Another  perhaps  equally  plausible  characterization  is:  a  subject  matter  is  controversial  to  the  extent  
that  the  relevant  experts  in  that  subject  matter  disagree  about  propositions  central  to  that  subject  
matter.  Plausibly,  in  practice,  these  characterisations  will  pick  out  the  same  subject  matter.  Even  if  
not,  either  sufficiently  picks  out  claims  of  taste  as  controversial  subject  matter.  
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epistemic  peers  engaged  in  a  disagreement  about  politics  or  philosophy,  it’s  not  clear  how  A  
and  B  could  be  epistemic  peers  with  respect  to  some  taste-­‐‑claim.  People  can  disagree  about  
taste   claims,   but   never   as   epistemic  peers.”   In   reply,   we  may   point   out:   for   anything   two  
people   can   disagree   about,   they   can   disagree   about   as   epistemic   peers   and   potentially  
recognise  each  other  as   such   (and  so   the  doxastic   revision   issues  between  conformists  and  
non-­‐‑conformists  arise).  After  all,  if  A  and  B  disagree  about  whether  P  is  true,  then  (prior  to  the  
disagreement),  along  dimensions  of  intellectual  ability  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  determining  whether  p  and  
evidence  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p,  one  of  the  three  situations  will  be  the  case:  
  
(i) A   is   in   a   better   epistemic   position   along   these   dimensions   for   determining  
whether  p,  and  so  A  is  B’s  epistemic  superior;      
(ii) B   is   in   a   better   epistemic   position   along   these   dimensions   for   determining  
whether  p  than  A,  and  so  A  is  B’s  epistemic  inferior;    
(iii) A   is   in  a   relevantly  similar  epistemic  position   (to  B)  along   these  dimensions   for  
determining  whether  p,  and  so  A  and  B  are  epistemic  peers.  
  
If  A   and  B      are   epistemic   peers   about  whether  p,   then   given   suitable   disclosure   of  
their  positions  along  the  ability  and  evidential  dimensions,  A  and  B  can  recognise  each  other  
as   epistemic   peers   about   whether   p,   prior   to   disagreeing   about   p.   Thus,   if   A   and   B   can  
disagree  about  p,  one  way   they  can  disagree  about  p   is  as   recognised  epistemic  peers,  and  
then   the   question   arises:   is   doxastic   revision   rationally   required   in   the   face   of   this  
disagreement?  And  since  claims  of  taste  fall  squarely  in  a  category  of  the  sort  of  cases  that  
typically  motivate  conformism27:  a  plausible  answer  is  “yes.”  If  we  can  make  sense  of  how  
rationally  required  revision  of  beliefs  would  work   in   the   face  of  peer  disagreements  about  
taste,   when   the   disagreement  works   as   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   sees   it,   then   great   (for   the   truth-­‐‑
relativist’s  picture  of  disagreement)!    
If  not,  though,  the  faultless-­‐‑disagreement-­‐‑style  cases  to  which  truth-­‐‑relativists  appeal  
fail   to   have   the   sort   of   epistemic   significance   disagreements   (qua   disagreements)   are  
supposed   to   have   in   social   epistemology.   Plausibly,   an   account   of   disagreement  must   be  
amenable   to   accounts   of   the   characteristic   roles   disagreements   play   in   practice,   including  
their  epistemic  roles.  To  the  extent  that  faultless  disagreement  (as  championed  by  the  truth-­‐‑
relativist)   fails   to   play   such   a   role,   there   is   reason   to   cast   doubt   on   the  matter   of  whether  
these  are  disagreements  at  all.  And  if  they  are  not,  then  all  the  worse  for  the  truth-­‐‑relativist,  
who—as   we   saw   in   §2—loses   traction   against   the   contextualist   to   the   extent   that  
                                                                                                              
27  See  fn.  25.  Also,  thanks  to  an  anonymous  referee  for  pointing  out  that,  in  aesthetic  disputes  
particularly,  a  non-­‐‑conformist  position  could  be  potentially  be  motivated  in  part  by  considering  that  
disputants  behave  in  practice  as  though  non-­‐‑conformism  were  correct.  Does  the  fact  that  disputants  
act  as  though  non-­‐‑conformism  is  true  (by  in  fact  holding  their  guns)  in  area  X  favour  non-­‐‑conformism  
in  area  X  as  a  position  about  the  rationality  of  doxastic  revision  in  area  X?    It’s  not  clear  that  it  does  any  
more  than  it  suggests,  as  Feldman  would  contend,  that  most  disputants  hold  their  guns  unreasonably  
in  these  areas.  
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disagreement   is   lost.   Taking   a   step   back,   it   should   be   clear   now   why   the   relationship  
between   disagreement   in   the   philosophy   of   language   and   social   epistemology   is   actually  
something  on  which  a  good  deal  hangs.    
That  said,  let’s  consider  one  more  avenue  of  resistance  to  the  inter-­‐‑debate  gambit  I’ve  
sketched  for  truth-­‐‑relativist  disagreement:  suppose  one  denies  that  (in  the  arena  of  claims  of  
taste)  there  could  be  recognised  peer  disagreement  because  there  is  no  proper  disagreement  at  
all   in   this   area   because,   for   example,   disagreement   over   centred   content   isn’t   genuine  
disagreement,  or,  following  the  expressivist,  such  claims  express  attitudes  and  are  not  truth-­‐‑
apt  in  a  way  that  allows  for  genuine  disagreement  (thus  nor  recognised  peer  disagreement)).  
To  this  line,  we  may  reply:  perhaps  that’s  right.  Maybe  there  is  no  genuine  disagreement  at  
all  when  A   says   “This   is   tasty”   and  B   says   “This   is   not   tasty.28”   But   no  position  has   been  
taken  here.  To  be  clear:  what  I’m  interested  in  is  how  to  make  sense  of  the  social-­‐‑epistemic  
side  of  disagreement   if  we  take   the   truth-­‐‑relativist  at  her  word.  The  truth  relativist   tells  us  
(emphatically,   in  debates  with   the   contextualist)   that   these   are   disagreements.  And   as   I’ve  
suggested,   for   any   p,   if   two   people   can   disagree   about   whether   p,   they   can   do   so   as  
recognised  epistemic  peers.  And  if  they  do  so  as  epistemic  peers,  then  if  the  debate  is  in  an  
area  apposite  to  conformism,  truth-­‐‑relativist-­‐‑style  disagreement  had  better  be  such  that  we  
can  make  sense  of  being  rationally  required  to  revise  our  beliefs  in  light  of  recognised  (truth-­‐‑
relativist)  peer  disagreement.  Let’s   turn  now  to   the  question  of  whether  such  sense  can  be  
made.  
  
5.  Truth-­‐‑relativist  disagreement  and  doxastic  revision  
Let  F  be  the  claim  “Bob  Saget  is  funny,”  sincerely  expressed  by  Libby.  Libby  says  “F,”  and  
Libby’s  respected  colleague,  Eunice,  who  typically  shares  Libby’s  sense  of  humour,   replies  
with  ~F.    
   As   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   tells  us,  “F”—that   is,  “Bob  Saget   is   funny”—is   true   for  Libby  
and   false   for   Eunice.   They   also   tell   us   it   is   a   disagreement.   If   it   is   a   disagreement,   then   it  
should  play  the  relevant  epistemic  role  that  disagreements  play  in  social  epistemology.  Since  
any  disagreement  about  whether  p  can  in  principle  be  a  disagreement  individuals  approach  
as  epistemic  peers  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p,   and  since   this  particular   subject  matter   is  one   that  plausibly  
squares  with  conformism  as  an  approach  to  epistemic  peer-­‐‑disagreement,  the  truth-­‐‑relativist  
owes   us   an   explanation   for   the   following,   supposing   Libby   and   Eunice   are   recognised  
epistemic  peers  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  F:  
  
(R)  Rationality  requires   that,   if  Libby  and  Eunice  disagree  about  whether  F  and  are  
mutually   recognised   epistemic   peers   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   F,   then   in   light   of   the   fact   that   they  
disagree  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  F,  each  should  revise  her  respective  belief  about  whether  F.  
                                                                                                              
28  Dreier’s  observations  (considered  in  §3)  about  the  apparent  futility  of  the  practice  of  challenging  
(and  successfully  replying  to)  assertions,  within  the  frame-­‐‑work  of  truth-­‐‑relativism  could  be  taken  to  




As  we  noted   in  §4   in  considering  Elga’s  presentation  of   the  motivations   for  conformism,  a  
principle  like  (R)  is  premised  upon  a  related  principle  about  recognised  epistemic  peerhood,  
call  it  (EP):  
  
(EP)   If  A   and  B   are   recognised  epistemic  peers  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  F,   then  rationality   requires  
that  A  and  B  think,  before  disagreeing  about  F,  that  each  other  is  equally  likely  to  be  
right  about  whether  F.  
  
   If  the  truth  relativist  is  to  make  sense  of  (R),  the  truth  relativist  must  be  able  to  make  
sense   of   (EP).   Can   the   truth-­‐‑relativist  make   sense   of   (EP)?   It’s   clear   to   see   that   when   the  
disagreement  is  about  the  truth  of  a  traditional  proposition,  (EP)  would  seem  right:  If  A  and  
B  recognise  each  other  as  epistemic  peers,  then  they  would  be  rationality  required  to  think  
(prior   to  disagreement)   each  other   is   equally   likely   to  be   right   about  F   (otherwise,   it’s  not  
clear  that  they  have  recognised  each  other  as  epistemic  peers).  
It’s  much  less  clear  though  how  we  can  make  much  sense  of  (EP)  in  the  context  of  the  
truth  relativist’s  faultless  disagreement.  Take  again  Libby  and  Eunice  and  the  centred  (taste-­‐‑
neutral)  proposition  “Bob  Saget  is  funny,”  which  gets  a  truth  value  only  relative  to  a  ‘judge’  
parameter—Libby,   when   Libby   is   evaluating   the   proposition,   Eunice,   when   Eunice   is  
evaluating  the  proposition.  Let’s  now  suppose  the  antecedent  of  (EP)  is  satisfied,  and  A  and  
B   are   recognised   epistemic   peers   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  F.   This  means   that   Libby   and  Eunice   recognise  
each  other  as  satisfying  Lackey’s  cognitive  equality  and  evidential  equality  criteria  for  epistemic  
peerhood:   so   each   recognises   the  other   as   equally   intelligent   and   capable  on   the  matter   at  
hand—they  both  recognise  each  other  as  having  watched  all  the  same  Saget  programs  and  
having   (say)   read  all   the  same   literature  on  humour.  Does   it   follow  that  Libby  and  Eunice  
are   rationally   required   to   accept   each  other   as   equally   likely   to  be   right   about  whether  F?  
Importantly,   no.   For   the   truth   relativist,   the   connection   between   epistemic   peerhood   and  
likelihood  of  getting  it  right  breaks  down.  This  is  because  cognitive  equality  and  evidential  
equality  don’t  entail  standards  equality,  and  standards  equality  is  just  as  relevant  to  getting  it  
right,   for   the   truth-­‐‑relativist.   (After   all,   the   sort   of   claims   being   disagreed   about   are   true  
relative  not  only  to  the  state  of  the  world  but  also  to  the  evaluator’s  standard).  So  the  truth-­‐‑
relativist   can’t   coherently   endorse   (EP),   but   without   endorsing   (EP),   it’s   unclear   how   the  
truth-­‐‑relativist  is  supposed  to  make  sense  of  (R).  An  uncomfortable  upshot,  then,  is  that,  two  
individuals  can  recognise  each  other  as  epistemic  peers  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p  by  recognising  each  other  
to  be  cognitively  and  evidentially  symmetrical  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p  and  yet  
  
(i)   not   be   in   a  position   to   rationally   conclude   (prior   to   the  disagreement)   that   each  
other  is  equally  likely  to  be  right  about  p;  and  
(ii)  never  be  rationally  required  by  the  fact  of  this  disagreement  to  revise  their  beliefs  




A  general  result,  then,  is  that:  the  truth  relativist  cannot  explain  how  epistemic  peer  
disagreement   is   ever   epistemically   significant;   for  persons  A,  B,   if  A   and  B   recognise   each  
other  as  epistemic  peers  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p  and  then  find  out  that  they  come  to  different  conclusions  
about  whether  p,   this   fact  will   never  make   it   rationally   required   for  A   to   revise   her   belief  
about  whether  p.  Given   that   both   conformism   and  Lackey’s   intermediate   position   on  peer  
disagreement   support   a   conformist   reading   (on   which   at   least   some   doxastic   revision   is  
rationally   required)   in   cases   where   we   have   recognised   peer   disagreements   about   taste-­‐‑
claims,  the  fact  that  the  truth-­‐‑relativist’s  faultless  disagreements  lack  the  ability  to  play  this  
plausible   social-­‐‑epistemic   role   disagreements   play   (in   such   cases)   qua   disagreements   is   a  
strike   against   faultless   disagreements;   these   alleged   disagreements   are   not   epistemically  
significant  in  the  way  disagreements  are  thought  to  be  in  social  epistemology.  But  given  the  
way  the  challenge/assertion  game  would  be  played,  this  is  just  what  we’d  expect.  The  fact  of  
disagreement  itself  would  lack  any  epistemic  significance;  as  we  saw  Dreier  pointed  out,  the  
parties  in  the  dispute,  in  response  to  the  mutually  recognised  fact  of  disagreement  (peer  or  
otherwise),  would  have  no  reason  to  do  anything  other  than  steadfastly  repeat  themselves  in  
a  way  that  constitutes  a  successful  meeting  of  the  challenge,  again  and  again  (ad  nauseum).  
The   situation   gets   a   bit   worse,   though.   Recall   that   whenever   A   and   B   genuinely  
disagree   about  whether   p,   then   (prior   to   the   disagreement),   along   Lackey’s   cognitive   and  
evidential   dimensions   relevant   to   correctly   evaluating   whether   p,   A   will   be   either   B’s  
epistemic   peer,   inferior   or   superior.   So   if   taste   disagreements   are   disagreements   about  
whether   something   is   so,   they   can   be   disagreements   approached   in   such   a   way   that   one  
party  is  a  recognised  epistemic  superior  of  another:  that  is,  if  what’s  at  issue  is  whether  p,  one  
party  can  be  better  cognitively  and  evidentially  positioned  to  determining  whether  p.  
Suppose  A   and  B   stand   in   a   starkly   asymmetrical   relationship   along   both   of   these  
dimensions  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p.  Suppose  further  A  and  B,  over  a  cup  of  tea,  are  keenly  aware  of  the  
asymmetry.  A   says  p,  but  B   says  ~p.  B  here   is  A’s   (recognised)  epistemic  superior  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  
whether  p.   Is  doxastic  revision  rationally  required  for  A   in  the  face  of  disagreement  with  a  
recognised  epistemic  superior?  It  seems  so.  As  Bryan  Frances,  says:  
  
It  may   seem  obvious   that   upon   such   a  discovery   I   should   at   the   very   least   reduce  my  
confidence  level  in  P  by  some  significant  amount,  if  not  withhold  belief  entirely  or  move  
closer  to  her  view  than  my  old  view.  (Frances  2012,  2)  
  
   Whether  doxastic   revision   is   rationally   required   in   the   face  of  disagreement  with  a  
recognised   epistemic   peer   has   generated   much   more   discussion   than   the   same   question  
regarding  epistemic  superiors,  because—with  epistemic  superiors—the  question  seems  to  be  
‘how  much’  doxastic   revision   is   rationally   required,   rather   than   ‘whether’   it   is   required.   If  
things  were  otherwise,  we  would  have  a  hard  time  explaining  why  it  is  irrational  (all  things  
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equal)  to  be  doxastically  unmoved  by  the  testimony  of  experts29.  In  the  face  of  disagreement  
with  a  recognised  epistemic  superior,  it  is  prima  facie  plausible  to  suppose  you  are  rationally  
required  not  only  to  revise  your  belief,  or  to  withhold,  but  to  positively  move  your  credence  
towards   the   view   of   the   expert.   Because   this   last   bit   is   somewhat   controversial30,   let’s  
suppose  something  considerably  weaker,  and  so:  
  
(R*)   Rationality   requires   that,   if   A   and   B   disagree   about   whether   p   and   B   is   A’s  
recognised  epistemic   superior  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p,   then   in   light  of   the   fact   that   they  disagree  
vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p,  A  should  (to  some  extent)  revise  her  respective  belief  about  whether  p.  
  
And  (R*)  is  premised  upon  something  like:  
  
(EP*)  If  B  is  A’s  recognised  epistemic  superior  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p,  then  rationality  requires  that  
A   think,  before   disagreeing   about  p,   that  A   is   (at   least   somewhat)  more   likely   to   be  
right  about  p  than  B.  
  
It   would   be   quite   bad   if   the   truth-­‐‑relativist’s   faultless   disagreements   were   not  
compatible   with   (R*).   But   truth-­‐‑relativist   disagreement   is   compatible   with   (R*)   only   if  
compatible   with   EP*.   But   truth-­‐‑relativists   disagreements   are   not   even   in   principle  
compatible   with   EP*.   This   is   because   cognitive   superiority   (vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   p)   and   evidential  
superiority  (vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  p)  don’t  entail  standards  superiority  (or  even  standards  equality)  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑
vis  p,  and  standards  (which  fix  the   judge  parameter)  are   just  as  relevant  to  getting  it  right,  
for  the  truth-­‐‑relativist.  
One   might   balk   and   suppose   that   that   no   two   individuals   can   enter   into   a   taste  
agreement  where  one  is  an  epistemic  superior,  and  so  the  worry  that   truth-­‐‑relativists  can’t  
preserve  EP*  (and  R*)  regarding  taste  disagreements  is  circumvented.  But  this  worry  can  be  
countered  the  same  way  we  countered  the  same  worry  mutatis  mutandis  for  epistemic  peers.  
The   reply   is   that,   if  A   and  B  genuinely  disagree  about  whether   something   is   so,   then   they  
may  or  may  not  be  symmetrical  with  respect  to  their  cognitive  abilities  and  evidence  that  are  
relevant   to  determining  whether  p.   If   a   faultless  disagreement   is   a  disagreement,   then  qua  
disagreement,  it  should  (in  a  context  where  there  is  stark  asymmetry  between  A  and  B  along  
cognitive   and   evidential   dimensions   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   p)   be   epistemically   significant.   But   such  
disagreements  never  will  be.  
  
6.  Conclusion  
                                                                                                              
29  Consider  here  Elga’s  (2007,  479)  discussion  of  epistemic  superiority  in  a  weather  forecasting  case:  
“How,  exactly,  should  we  be  guided  by  outside  opinions?...  Start  with  the  simplest  case:  complete  
deference.  When  it  comes  to  the  weather,  I  completely  defer  to  the  opinions  of  my  local  weather  
forecaster  .My  probability  for  rain,  given  that  her  probability  for  rain  is  60%,  is  also  60%.”  
30  Cf.  Frances    
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Although  disagreement  plays  (very)  different  roles  in  debates  in  the  philosophy  of  language  
and  in  social  epistemology,  these  debates  could  stand  to  learn  from  each  other,  and  I  hope  to  
have  drawn  attention  to  one  important  point  of  connection.  In  particular,  I’ve  suggested  that  
any   attempt   to   ‘save’   disagreement   by   the   truth-­‐‑relativists   in   the   philosophy   of   language  
should   aspire   to   save   something   capable   of   playing   the   characteristically   epistemically  
significant   role   disagreement   is   supposed   to   play   in   social-­‐‑epistemic   practice;   I’ve   given  
reason  to  doubt  that  the  sort  of  disagreement  the  truth-­‐‑relativist  appeals  to  as  an  advantage  
over  the  contextualist  could  ever  play  such  an    epistemically  significant  role.    
I  leave  open  whether  the  worry  I  raise  is  sufficient  for  rejecting  truth-­‐‑relativism,  all-­‐‑
things-­‐‑considered;   I   insist   only   that   we   should   be   sceptical   of   any   argument   for   truth-­‐‑
relativism   that   relies   on   premises   that   suggest   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   has   preserved  
disagreement.   From   the   perspective   of   social   epistemology,   it   seems   the   epistemic  
significance   of   disagreement   is   preserved   by   the   truth-­‐‑relativist   no   better   than   by   the  
contextualist,  and  this  should  be  concerning  for  the  truth-­‐‑relativist.    
Plausibly,  the  issue  examined  here  is  but  one  of  many  points  of  connection  between  
disagreement   in  social  epistemology  and  the  philosophy  of   language,  and  it  would  benefit  
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